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more acceptable as a definition of the pleasure of the undeveloped consciousness, make it less satisfactory as a definition of the developed ; *e.g.*, the philosopher's pleasure in finding and giving a correct definition.

I am not clear as to the Hedonistic implications which I fear the phrase contains, and shall not therefore urge them. But I would ask, does not Mr. Mackenzie, in the January number of the *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS*, page 222, make "the measurement of value" equal "the measurement of pleasure"? and is that not to adopt the Hedonistic conclusion? In this point and in his distinction between subjective and objective values, Mr. Mackenzie seems to assert that at least the sentient consciousness is Hedonistic. It is difficult to understand "subjective value" as, in any sense in which it does not simply mean "illusion of value," opposed to "objective value," and yet not think of value as pleasure.

It would be interesting to know why Professor Mackenzie declined to follow the lead of Aristotle, Kant, Lotze, and others who have defined pleasure in relation to its conditions. Kant's "*Vergnügen ist das Gefühl der Beförderung ; Schmerz das einer Hinder-niss des Lebens*,"* seems to mean very much what I take it Mr. Mackenzie means, but it avoids the difficulties which attach to what Mr. Mackenzie says.

If the Kantian definition be too wide, will not the limitation by Lotze† meet the facts? "If the advantage and harm be momentary and local, the exceptions seem to disappear."‡

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MR. MACKENZIE'S REPLY.

I find myself in agreement with most of what Miss Gilliland says. I have all along been perfectly well aware that the phrase "sense of value" is open to the objections which she urges. My only defence is, that it is the best phrase I can find. It seems clear that *any* attempt to define so elementary an experience as that of

* Kant, "*Anthropologie*," Book II., p. 549, ed. Hartenstein.

† Lotze, "*Medicinische Psychologie*," 1852, pp. 237-239.

‡ Mr. Bradley, "*Mind*," xiii.

pleasure and pain* must lead us into difficulties. It can only be defined in terms of experiences that are more complex than itself. This is a difficulty, however, which comes up also in other parts of the study of psychology, and, indeed, in other studies as well. It is doubtful, for instance, whether any account can be given of the sense-experiences of a merely animal consciousness, except by referring to the more fully developed human consciousness, and then pointing out what must be supposed to be absent in the case of the more elementary experience. Similarly, I am disposed to agree with the Master of Balliol† in thinking that religion is best defined by reference to its most developed form; though in that case we have to recognize that in its earlier manifestations much that we include in our definition is only implicitly present. I suspect that this is the case with nearly every developing object. The earliest manifestation of such an object does not reveal its full significance, and we can only explain what it is by saying that it is implicitly something else.

In the case of pleasure and pain it may be said that we require no definition. The algedonic experience (if we are to use Mr. Rutgers Marshall's phrase) is so simple and well known that it requires no further explication. Yet, for certain purposes, we do require a definition of these terms, as of all others,—*i.e.*, we require some general statement of the relationship in which the experiences denoted by them stand to the other leading elements in our experience. Now there are, broadly speaking, two ways in which this might be done. We might state the relationship between the feeling aspect of our psychical life and the other aspects of it,—*i.e.*, we might express the relationship between pleasure (including pain) and such other aspects of our experience as sensation, knowledge, desire, emotion, will; or, on the other hand, we might state the relation between feeling and some extra-psychical form of existence,—*e.g.*, the processes of our organic constitution. The former was what I attempted; the latter is what Miss Gilliland suggests as preferable. There are difficulties involved in either

* I do not know why Miss Jones complains that I take no account of pain. I have always supposed that pain (in the only sense in which we are here concerned with it) is simply the negative (in the mathematical sense,—*i.e.*, the positive negative, the contrary) of pleasure; and that in dealing with the one I was also dealing with the other. Pain, in the sense of the organic sensation of pain, would of course be quite irrelevant to the present discussion.

† "Evolution of Religion," Lectures II. and III.

method ; but, on the whole, the difficulties appeared to me to be less when we confine ourselves to the content of the individual consciousness than when we go beyond this and introduce considerations that are physiological or psychophysical. This is, roughly, my answer to Miss Gilliland ; but it may be well to reply to some of her points a little more in detail.

1. I admit that if you take the idea of judgment wholly away, it would be difficult to say what is left in the feeling of pleasure. But in the same way I can hardly tell what the objective experiences of an animal consciousness would amount to apart from the implicit forms of judgment by which objects are constituted. I can only suppose, in a general way, that many things can be present in consciousness in a rudimentary form before the judgments that give them their ultimate significance have been definitely evoked.

Similarly, I fully admit that the idea of value involves the idea of a self for whom the value exists ; and I think it desirable to avoid the implication of a self as far as possible in the definition of pleasure. It was for this reason that I rejected Mr. Bradley's definition of it as the feeling of self-realizedness.* But I have expressly endeavored to explain (though, perhaps, not with sufficient fulness and clearness) that in speaking of value in this connection I am using the term in an anticipatory sense. I conceive that we may in this way speak of value even with reference to a plant, if we interpret the facts of plant life in a teleological sense. Now, wherever there is pleasure and pain there is a kind of teleology. The painful is avoided, the pleasant is sought ; and this long before there is any conscious idea of an end. Wherever there is pleasure and pain there is a kind of choice, though not always a rational choice. There is the acceptance of this rather than that ; and this implies some sort of end in view, though the idea of the end

* Which is open to the further objection that there are different selves in consciousness, and that the feeling of pleasure does not always accompany the realization of the highest of these. I ought to add, however, that in his article on "Association and Thought" ("Mind," vol. xii.), Mr. Bradley seems to me to have stated his view in a way that is free from these objections. In that article he seems fully to recognize that the self to which reference is made must be understood in an anticipatory or proleptical sense. Perhaps the least objectionable definition is to say that pleasure is the vague consciousness of a harmony of the particular content of a psychical state with the form of the group within which it is included. But this would require a good deal of explanation. I still think that "sense of value" is the simplest phrase to express what is intended.

may not be consciously present. The consciousness of the end and the definite recognition of the value of different objects with reference to that end would involve a consciousness of self; but it seems legitimate to speak of the implicit presence of an end, and the implicit appreciation of value, prior to the development of any such consciousness. I admit that there is a kind of prolepsis in such a mode of statement; but I do not see how it is possible, except proleptically, to make intelligible statements with regard to any psychological processes that are not intelligent.

2. I have already explained that I have adopted one of two alternative methods of defining feeling (pleasure-pain), viz., that of showing its relation to the other leading aspects of our conscious life. Hence I do not see much point in the complaint that I have represented it as involving an "implicit judgment" and an "unreasoned choice." It is probably true, however (and this is a point which has also been brought out by Miss Jones), that I have not made it sufficiently clear that I regard feeling of pleasure and pain as the purely subjective side of these activities. Judgment and choice of course involve an objective reference, and so include much more than the mere feeling of agreeableness or disagreeableness. This feeling is merely the sense of harmony or disharmony which constitutes the purely subjective side of such judgments and choices.

3. I am a little amused to find that Miss Gilliland seems to suspect me of a leaning to Hedonism. If I am too hedonistic for Miss Gilliland and not hedonistic enough for Miss Jones, I may perhaps hope that I am somewhere not so very far from the mean. But what is the precise point of Miss Gilliland's accusation? What I have said in the January number of the *INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS*, p. 222, is not that the "measurement of value" is equal to the "measurement of pleasure," but that the only way to "make sense" of the "measurement of pleasure" is to interpret it as meaning the "measurement of value" as implicitly apprehended without reason (or at least not necessarily with reason). Among economists, Professor Marshall has, I think, now fully recognized that what is really measured in the so-called measurement of pleasure is value as estimated by human beings in the expenditure of their money and other industrial transactions (in this case, therefore, not entirely without reason). In taking a similar view of the only intelligible meaning that could be given to the measurement of pleasure generally, I am surely very far from identifying myself with the hedonistic position. I should be somewhat surprised that such a

misconception as this should have been possible, were it not that my experience of controversy has led me to think that it is on the whole rather the exception than the rule for any person to understand any other.

Also, I do not affirm that the sentient consciousness is hedonistic. On the contrary, at all stages of consciousness I should distinguish between the subjective and objective aspects, and should hold that on the whole it is in all cases the objective aspect that is valued, while the subjective aspect merely represents the fact that we do value it. Perhaps Miss Gilliland is right in thinking that "it is difficult to understand 'subjective value' as in any sense* opposed to 'objective value,' and yet not think of value as pleasure." But I would remind her of the saying, *Ardua quæ pulchra*. Perhaps, if she will try very hard, she may succeed even here. Would it help her at all if I were to substitute Meinong's expressions, *Werthhaltung* and *Werth*† (or say, in English, estimation and value), for subjective and objective value?

If it would interest Miss Gilliland to know why I did not follow the lead of Kant, Lotze, and others‡ in the way she suggests, it will not take very long to explain the reason. It is, briefly, that I think the idea of a "sense of value" is somewhat clearer and less ambiguous than that of a "feeling of the promotion of life," even when the latter is qualified in the careful way in which Lotze has explained it. It would, I think, take some time to explain what is meant by "life," and what is meant by its "promotion;" and, indeed, I am not sure that, in defining the latter expression, the conception

* I observe that Miss Gilliland has now added "in which it does not simply mean 'illusion of value.'" I do not think it *simply* means "illusion of value." If I value anything, I do value it; though I may be wrong in supposing it to have objective value. In any case, I value *it*, not the pleasure of it.

† See his "Psychologische-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werth-Theorie," Part I., Chapter III. I may say here that this book seems to me to contain much the best discussion of the whole subject of value from the point of view of psychology and ethics. I hope to have an early opportunity of explaining in what respects I cannot regard it as altogether satisfactory.

‡ I observe that Miss Gilliland has added the name of Aristotle in the proof. Aristotle's view, as I understand it, was that pleasure is the accompaniment of the perfect functioning of an organ. This is not so much a definition of pleasure as a psycho-physical statement with regard to it; and it would require a good deal of straining to make it applicable to intellectual pleasures. My own aim was not to give a psycho-physical explanation, but simply to state what pleasure means for the consciousness that feels it.

of value could be altogether kept out. But if Miss Gilliland will explain how we are to define "life" and "promotion" in a way that will be generally intelligible, and that will avoid the difficulties which I admit are involved in the proleptic introduction of the idea of value, I should be deeply grateful, and should have no hesitation in accepting the definition,* believing, as I do, that it would then mean nothing different from what I have sought to express.

I should have wished to take this opportunity of adding a few words on the points referred to by Miss Jones in the January number; but I fear that I could not open up these questions again without multiplying explanations in a way that would carry me far beyond the limits of a discussion note, and that might very likely in the end bring us no nearer to a mutual understanding. I suspect that our points of view are too far asunder for discussion to be profitable. Perhaps I may just be allowed to make two remarks.

1. When Miss Jones defined pleasure as feeling "judged in itself desirable," it certainly did not occur to me that she meant "judged by Butler, Spencer, and one or two others." I assumed that she meant "judged by the consciousness that feels it." With this I was disposed to agree, except that (1) I doubted the legitimacy of the introduction of the conception of an explicit judgment, which seems not to be always present in the feeling of pleasure; and (2) I doubted whether it is the pleasure in itself that is judged to be desirable, and not rather the objective content felt as pleasant. I did not, of course, mean to deny that some people have judged pleasure to be desirable; but it certainly surprises me that such a fact as this should be introduced into a definition of pleasure.
2. When I referred to the ends contemplated by such writers as Spencer and Stephen, I was, of course, not referring to the hedonistic element in their teaching, but to their attempts to define such objective ends as the adjustment of organism to environment, health, or, to use Professor Alexander's phrase, social equilibrium.

I hope that these remarks may help in some degree to clear up my own views on this subject. My experience of the general

* At least with one slight reservation. I do not think I could, in any case, define pleasure as a feeling *of* the furtherance of life, but at most as the feeling which *accompanies* such furtherance. On the other hand, it *is*, I think, a sense *of* value, in the meaning now explained.

results of controversy in such matters is not such as to afford any ground for hoping that anything that I may say will carry conviction either to Miss Gilliland or to Miss Jones.

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“RATIONAL HEDONISM.”—NOTE BY MR. BRADLEY.

Every one interested in this subject will, I am sure, be grateful to Miss Jones and to Professor Mackenzie for their instructive discussion. I am not venturing to express an opinion on the controversy as a whole, but there is a point on which, if Miss Jones were willing to develop her views, I think others as well as myself would receive them with attention. The question to which I should welcome an answer is this: Why should the Hedonist seek to deny worth of everything other than pleasantness? If it is admitted (as I, for example, can admit) that the pleasant is the good and the good pleasant, and that the better is more pleasant and the more pleasant better, why should the Hedonist desire to go further? As soon as I allow that nothing without pleasure has worth, and that the more valuable is more pleasant, and that pleasantness may be used as a measure of goodness, how is the Hedonist interested in trying to force me to deny worth of all else but mere pleasantness? Practically, I am sure that this denial will in some minds always cause moral repulsion, and theoretically I cannot see what it brings in except difficulty. It entails in any case the task of making good an abstraction which is so extreme that, even if it were true, I do not see how we could show its truth, and which, even if really self-consistent, seems hardly self-evident. And in the case of those who hold with Miss Jones the trouble seems increased. If reason is in the end in some sense to qualify the end, can it be rational to set up first the end unqualified and to strain oneself to deny worth of all else but this abstraction? Or, again, can reason qualify the end and yet add nothing to it? for reason hardly, I presume, can consist in mere subtraction. And if the end really is not the end unless qualified by reason, surely something beyond mere pleasantness has been from the first included in the end. But I am well aware that it is dangerous to make inquiries where one does not understand, and my question perhaps rests on a complete misconception, towards the removal of which I have no right to claim assistance. Still, others may be more or less in the same case with myself, if not with regard to reason, at least with regard to the